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On September 30, 2003, Boston University and the
University of Texas at Galveston were each award-
ed $120 million by the National Institute of Allergy
and Infectious Diseases to build a biosafety level 4
laboratory. Nine regional biocontainment labora-
tories were funded along with these two national
biocontainment laboratories. In announcing the
awards, Secretary of Health and Human Services
Tommy Thompson described them as “a major step
towards being able to provide Americans with effec-
tive therapies, vaccines and diagnostics for diseas-
es caused by agents of bioterror as well as for nat-
urally occurring emerging infections.”
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The funding was provided by the Department
of Homeland Security. Of the department’s $37.7
billion budget for 2003, $5.9 billion, or 16 per-
cent, was devoted to defending the United States
against bioterrorism. Of this amount, $2.4 billion
was allocated to support scientific research and de-
velopment to “provide America with the medical
tools necessary to effectively respond to a biologi-
cal attack.”
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The University of Texas and Boston University,
which won a competitive bidding process to receive
the awards, have promised $50 million in match-
ing funds. In Boston, estimates are that the labo-
ratory will generate up to $1.7 billion in research
grants during the next 20 years. The university antic-
ipates the creation of 1960 new jobs, of which about
600 will be permanent research positions and the
rest will be in construction work.
Economic benefits notwithstanding, there has
been considerable popular opposition to such proj-
ects. Citing U.S. environmental law, community
groups in California and New Mexico are suing to
stop the expansion of biodefense facilities. The Uni-
versity of California at Davis competed for fund-
ing but was unsuccessful, at least in part because
of community opposition: activists sent more than
1200 pages to the National Institutes of Health
documenting their opposition, and the Davis City
Council voted unanimously against the project. The
University of Texas, which has been actively en-
gaged in discussions with the community since
1997, has nevertheless faced public concern about
building the facility in an area that is prone to hur-
ricanes; the university has also been fighting free-
dom-of-information requests for details of its bio-
defense research.
In Boston, in spite of the support of the mayor,
the governor of Massachusetts, and most state and
local politicians, the project has met with vocal op-
position from some community groups. The oppo-
nents argue that the facility would pose a health
threat because of the possible release of deadly
pathogens and the risks associated with transport-
ing dangerous materials through busy city streets.
They argue, moreover, that the presence of the fa-
cility would make Boston a target for terrorists.
They also maintain that those who live in the com-
munity would not be qualified for the highly
skilled jobs that would become available. Others
oppose the facility on the grounds that much of the
proposed research would be prohibited under Bos-
ton’s 1994 public health regulations. Still others
fear that the research in biocontainment laborato-
ries undermines the international nonproliferation
regime and particularly the 1975 Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), which prohib-
its research on offensive biologic weapons.
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These critics miss the point. There are real ques-
tions to be asked about the wisdom of establishing
these costly facilities, but the critics are not asking
them. The research could probably be squared with
the BWC, which does permit limited defensive re-
search on biologic weapons. Public health regula-
tions are always subject to revision. With a concert-
ed campaign to guarantee specific benefits to the
community and present the readily available em-
pirical evidence on the safety of high-security labo-
ratories, Boston University could alleviate most of
the community’s worries, as the University of Tex-
as has done. Moreover, the notion that terrorists
would target a city because it hosts a biodefense fa-
cility flies in the face of everything we know about
the practices of terrorists. Terrorists operate under
conditions of enormous uncertainty and historical-
ly have been very conservative in their tactics. They
prefer soft targets — a nightclub in Bali or commut-
er trains in Madrid — to protected sites such as a se-
cure laboratory or military facility. Moreover, they
like their victims to be as random as possible, be-
cause if no one is targeted then no one is safe, and
the terror is more widespread.
The construction of these facilities may actually
increase the likelihood of a terrorist attack involving
the use of biologic weapons, but not in a way that the
critics have predicted. The key scarcity among ter-
rorists is a dearth of adherents with the skills to
understand and deploy biologic weapons. The op-
eration of these facilities will require the training of
scores, if not hundreds, of people to work with
deadly pathogens. By training more experts in bio-
logic weapons, we are increasing the probability that
one or more of them will have sympathies with a
terrorist organization. There is much we still do not
know about the anthrax attacks of 2001, but the an-
thrax has apparently been traced to a biosafety level 4
laboratory in Fort Detrick, Maryland, although there
is no evidence of any link to foreign terrorists.
There is a real possibility that terrorists will use
biologic weapons, but the probability is lower than
media speculation suggests. Biologic agents are not
easy weapons for terrorists to use. The Aum Shinri-
kyo cult in Japan, the group that released sarin gas
in the Tokyo subway in 1995, was unusual because
of the number of skilled scientists among its mem-
bers, its immunity from police surveillance because
of its religious affiliation, and the extent of its re-
sources. Yet Aum Shinrikyo tried for years to create
a successful biologic weapon and eventually gave
up in favor of easier chemical weapons. Even then,
the group’s deployment of sarin gas succeeded in
killing only 12 people, despite 12 attempts in five
years. Moreover, even with the use of highly refined
anthrax in the United States, only 5 people died and
22 were sickened, as compared with the far greater
casualties caused by far more mundane weapons.
Terrorists prefer simple, easily accessible weapons,
such as fertilizer, cellular telephones, box cutters,
and jet fuel, to complex and hard-to-deploy weap-
ons such as biologic and chemical agents. Ironically,
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Figure. CDC Researchers in a Biosafety Level 4 Laboratory, Atlanta.
 
Courtesy of James Gathany, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
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then, the effort to reduce the threat of biologic weap-
ons could actually increase it by rendering more
people competent in their use.
Would our vulnerability to a bioterrorist attack
be more likely to be reduced by other expenditures?
With unlimited resources, one would fund all good
ideas, but in a time of budgetary restraints, trade-
offs must be made. One relevant program that has
been chronically underfunded and poorly managed
is the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) pro-
gram of the Department of Defense. This program
was established in 1991 to secure sites housing nu-
clear, chemical, and biologic weapons in the former
Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had the most in-
tensive biologic-weapons program in history, and
stores of dangerous pathogens such as anthrax,
smallpox, and Ebola virus remain in unsecured sites
in areas where terrorist groups with a declared in-
terest in using such weapons have been increasing
their activities. Four years after the CTR began fo-
cusing on the security of such facilities, security
projects are under way at only 4 of the 49 known bi-
ologic-weapons sites, and only 2 of these sites have
been secured against external threats.
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 The CTR
has been funded at approximately $1 billion per
year since the 1990s, in spite of the recommenda-
tion of a bipartisan panel in 2001 that the funding
be tripled. Securing stocks of dangerous patho-
gens that are known to exist would enhance our se-
curity far more than developing new facilities in
which to conduct research on new stocks.
The construction of the new laboratories will
undoubtedly carry substantial economic benefits
for the community and important spinoff benefits
for medical research and public health. It has not
been demonstrated that these laboratories will re-
duce the risk of terrorist attack, nor that they are the
most cost-effective means of enhancing our securi-
ty with regard to bioterrorism. Medical research will
benefit from the infusion of government funding,
but the best medical research is likely to be driven by
the priorities identified by medical researchers, not
by what politicians think may be in the minds of
terrorists.
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Hypertension, which is common among adults in
the United States, has for several decades been rec-
ognized as a cardiovascular risk factor. Since blood
pressure tends to “track” along the same percentile
throughout life, children with higher blood pres-
sures are more likely to become adults with hyper-
tension. Therefore, the early recognition of the seeds
of hypertension is crucial for introducing early in-
terventions and reducing cardiovascular morbidi-
ty and mortality among adults. The potential bene-
fits of initiatives targeting such early recognition are
obvious.
One such initiative, Healthy People 2010, has
been launched by the U.S. government with the de-
clared “overarching goals” of increasing the quality
and duration of healthy life and eliminating dispar-
ities in health. The prevention of cardiovascular dis-
eases is targeted specifically, since a large segment
of the adult population has hypertension and is con-
sequently at risk for serious disease. As part of the
mechanism to achieve the stated goals, the govern-
ment has developed a network of Cardiovascular
Disease Enhanced Dissemination and Utilization
Centers, created as performance-based projects
with the dual aim of educating high-risk commu-
nities and promoting heart-healthy behavior in
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